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Managing Labor Migration in Northeast Asia

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MIGRATION PRESSURE IN ASIA

Demographic factors determine the long-term pattern of migration between countries. Industrialized countries in Asia have already gone through their demographic transition and their population growth is expected to be slow (Figure 9.1 and Table 9.1). Japan and, with some lag, the Asian NIEs – Hong Kong, Singapore, Taiwan, and South Korea – started experiencing labor shortages, which will become more acute as labor force growth rates continue to decline. Japan has been experiencing labor shortages since the 1980s, which will be worsening in the coming years because of the country's very slow labor force growth and its still robust employment growth in industry and services. South Korea and Taiwan have begun to experience labor shortages in some sectors lately and shortages of blue-collar workers should become more pervasive in the 1990s. The projected labor force growth indicates a slow growth of labor force against a projected substantial industrial employment growth (Bauer, 1990).

In contrast, some countries in South Asia and Southeast Asia that started or are about to start demographic transition have enormous population pressure (Figure 9.1). Given the sluggish growth record, these countries are not able to fully absorb the currently underemployed and new entrants to the labor force (Figure 9.2). Population pressure has been building up in the whole Indian subcontinent, which indicates potential outflows of migrants from the subcontinent in the near future as these countries move out of the subsistence income level. China, even though it is rather advanced in demographic transition, has a huge underemployed labor force seeking better job opportunities.

Growing income inequalities between the countries of the Asian region in the 1980s are a trigger for increased migration within the region (Table 9.2). Reduced costs of international travel and information due to communication and transportation developments have been conducive to increased mobility. In 1980, for example, just under 25,000 Asian contract workers found officially sanctioned employment in other Asian countries. By 1990, this figure had increased to over 120,000 (Stahl,

1993). This migration was largely temporary and undertaken for economic reasons. It takes two principal forms. First, there is the migration of high-level professional manpower (HLM) which is induced largely by direct foreign investment by Japan and the NIEs in other Asian countries. Second, there is the movement of low-level manpower(LLM). The low-level manpower movement is largely a response to significant cross-country differentials in earnings and employment opportunities. LLM assumes two forms: legal and illegal.

Recent trends indicate that there will be increasing pressures for migration toward Japan and more dynamic countries within Asia (Stahl, 1991; Martin, 1990). This is particularly so because of growing economic interdependence in Asia through capital and commodity flows. The penetration of Japanese capital in Asia had been considerable in the 1980s and the presence of Japanese capital and businesses in these countries, in turn, stimulated emigration toward Japan.

While temporary labor migration within Asia has become an increasingly important feature of the region, its study is hampered by poor and limited data deriving from the fact that a significant proportion of migrants are not properly documented. Data limitations also derive from the unwillingness of some governments to acknowledge publicly the extent of their reliance on migrant labor. These are problems associated with estimating the flows of labor. However, the problem of estimating stocks of migrant workers is even more problematic due to the circulatory nature of temporary labor migration.

MIGRATION DYNAMICS IN NORTHEAST ASIA

International labor movements are very likely because of the differences in resource endowments and the levels of development among the countries in the region (Table 9.3). The countries/areas of Northeast Asia can be grouped into three categories: the high-income, labor-deficit economies, the low-income, labor-deficit economies, and the low-income, labor-surplus economies. If land resource is added, it is possible to further divide the above three groups. Russia (especially the Russian Far East), Mongolia, and some portion of China represent a very large land mass, rich in mineral and forest resources, whereas Japan, North Korea, and South Korea are relatively small countries in terms of area and large amounts of their land is too mountainous for settlement. The tremendous rise in land prices in Japan, Taiwan and South Korea in the 1980s and associated problems represent the severity of population pressure on land. The recent rush of Japanese, Hong Kong, and Taiwan investors into the

west coast of North America reflects the underlying forces of capital and population movements in the North Pacific. In this regard, the Russian Far East has a great potential to host temporary migrants (both capital-associated and residential purposes), provided that its infrastructure and social facilities are upgraded and expanded. Japan, because of its superior economic power, could be an alternative destination for potential migrants from Asia and beyond.

Additional impetus for labor migration comes from systemic changes in the Asian socialist countries. As China, Russia, Mongolia, and to a lesser extent, North Korea, are moving away from a command economy to a mixed economy, there will be more reforms and industrial restructuring which will produce considerable flows of population within these countries that will eventually spill over to neighboring countries. In other words, the pressure to migrate will soon be built up in labor-surplus countries/areas if political barriers are lifted. China appears to be the most susceptible to potential emigration since it has suppressed people's mobility for over three decades. The over 10 million "floating population" and the unknown number of illegal exits are indicative of increasing migratory pressure in China, where a large portion of its 1.2 billion population is underemployed. Reforms that have been taken in the 1980s, such as decollectivization of farms, relaxation of migration to towns, new regulation on temporary residents in cities and towns, and changes in labor assignments and the employment system also contribute to migratory pressures within the country. Since the Chinese government cannot afford to accept these potential migrants as registered residents of cities, some spillover to neighboring economies is inevitable. Large number of long-term migrants – legal and illegal – have been flowing into Hong Kong, Japan, the United States and Australia.

Furthermore, China as a whole is not a land-rich country because of its huge population. As seen in Table 9.3, China ranks much below Canada and the United States and is closer to land-poor economies in terms of agricultural land available per capita. As mentioned by Chinese planners, there are more than 100 million "surplus" rural laborers in China's rural areas, indicating an enormous number of would-be migrants from rural to urban areas within China as well as would-be emigrants to other countries. Albeit to a lesser extent, North Korea shares these same attributes.

Yet migratory pressures based on economic forces do not automatically result in migrations, because border control usually intervenes as a determinative factor. International population movements are often impelled, encouraged, or prevented by governments or political

forces. Moreover, governments control the entry and exit of its citizens. States do play an important role in both creating and responding to international migration. Governments may force emigration as a means of achieving cultural homogeneity, dealing with political dissidents, pursuing foreign economic policy to extend control over territory, and destabilizing a neighboring state (Weiner, 1992/93). As such, migration is used as an instrument of the state and often constitutes a threat to the security and stability of other states.

In an ideal situation, migration across borders will strengthen ties of interdependence, promote social openness, and improve mutual understanding. They can contribute to the economic and social stability of the countries involved and thereby enable them to enjoy a higher level of security. In reality, however, international population movements often create conflicts within and between states. A massive migration from one country to other countries due to internal political disorder could pose a serious threat to national stability and international security. Globally, a serious reappraisal of the whole issue of international migration and labor movements and their implications for security and stability is under way in the industrialized states (Weiner, 1992/93; Widgren, 1990).[1] In the North Pacific, Japan has expressed a serious concern with the rapid increase of illegal foreign labor in recent years. Illegal entries of aliens through various routes raise a concern for economically depressed Americans. The recent arrivals of Chinese by boat to the U.S. coast heightened social awareness about migration. Immigration policies in the United States might become more restrictive in the future because ethnic conflicts and racism in the U.S. have been rising and economic protectionism has been gaining momentum.

The once restrictive emigration policies have begun to change in Russia and China, and it is likely that the trend will be further liberalization in the near future. A new immigration law will take effect in 1993 in Russia. China adopted a new emigration and immigration law in 1986 and for the first time relaxed exit restrictions (Wakabayashi, 1990). China's open-door policy and its establishment of diplomatic relations with Japan appear to have promoted migration toward Japan. Between 1980 and 1988, there was an annual average inflow of almost 10,000 Chinese into Japan, totaling 129,000 in 1988 (Ministry of Justice, 1990). Considering the increasing number of Chinese visitors to Japan (over 100,000 per annum in 1988 and 1989), it is very likely that there will be a growing number of Chinese immigrants in Japan.

LABOR SUPPLY AND DEMAND

The future of migration in Northeast Asia will depend on labor supply and demand dynamics in the countries involved as well as other Asian countries. Labor demand in the currently labor-deficit countries such as Japan and South Korea will not increase as rapidly as before since the industrial structure of both economies will move toward a high value-added and technology-intensive one. However, the demand for manual labor, especially for the low-paying, unskilled service-sector jobs, will increase and continue to attract migrant workers from poor countries because these jobs are shunned by residents of these countries. Similarly, because of the slow labor force growth projected for the 1990s and beyond, the domestic supply of labor in Japan and South Korea will not be enough in some sectors such as social and domestic services, and especially 3-D (dirty, dangerous, and difficult) jobs. Labor force growth projections suggest that Japan and South Korea have to resort to raising the labor force participation of women and the elderly, and importing foreign labor, or a combination of both (Kim, 1993). It will take time to substantially raise the labor force participation rate of women because of rigidities involved in changing social structures in the Confucian societies of Japan and South Korea. For a rapidly aging society like Japan, maintaining employment opportunities for older workers will be costly (Ono, 1990). Even with the increased labor force participation of women and the elderly, there will be labor shortages in the aforementioned 3-D jobs, which still require the importation of foreign labor. For South Korea, another source of labor supply would be military personnel. If there are any genuine arms reductions and peace agreements in the Korea Peninsula, tens of thousands of young men can reenter the labor market. This increase in labor supply will somewhat relieve the pressure for labor demands in most sectors except those 3-D jobs.

Unlike Japan, South Korea, and the Russian Far East, there is a large rural population in China and North Korea. In absolute numbers, China has a huge reserve of labor for nonagricultural employment. Northeast China alone can supply millions of laborers to other countries/areas. Furthermore, there are about one million unemployed young persons in urban areas. During the 1990s, there will be an annual average of 150,000 entering the labor force. As per capita cultivated land has been shrinking and agricultural mechanization has been proceeding in China, there will be less demand for agricultural labor in China. The situation also holds for Northeast China. For example, Jilin province will require only 5 million laborers in agriculture in 1995, but the estimated number of

rural laborers will be up to 7 million (Wang, 1991). Therefore, there will be at minimum 1 million surplus workers in Jilin. The situation in Liaoning and Heilongjiang is not much different from Jilin. During the decade of the 1980s, the total labor force increased by 4.6 million in Liaoning, 4.5 million in Jilin, and 3.5 million in Heilongjiang. Among these increases, the urban sector absorbed about 2.9, 1.7, and 2.6 million in Liaoning, Jilin, and Heilongjiang respectively. The substantial portion of labor absorption in the urban areas was due to the rapid growth of the collective sector (56%, 46%, and 42% respectively in the three provinces). However, such a rapid growth of employment in the collective sector may not be possible in the 1990s, considering the recent performance of the collective sector in the three provinces (during 1986-90, the collective sector employment grew annually by 0.9% in Liaoning, 1.3% in Jilin, and -0.2% in Heilongjiang).

Anticipated reform in the state enterprises and the consolidation of rural industries imply a moderate growth of non-agricultural employment in Northeast China in the 1990s. Industrial transition, particularly the growth of the services sector that had been underdeveloped in China's pre-reform period, may help absorb some idle labor, but the magnitude will not be sufficient to absorb all the currently unemployed, underemployed, and new entrants. Other measures to absorb labor need to be actively sought.

The labor demand and supply situation in North Korea cannot be assessed with any accuracy because of data unavailability. Population growth projection by age group in North Korea suggests that the labor force will grow quite fast (2.8% in the 1990s) and the dependency ratio will continue to increase until the year 2000 (Eberstadt and Banister, 1990). The still large rural population and the underdeveloped non-state sectors indicate potential labor surplus in North Korea. Similar to China, there is certain to be disguised unemployment in rural areas and redundant workers in the urban sector. Reduced tensions in the Korean Peninsula will add tens of thousands of demobilized servicemen to the potential labor surplus pool since North Korea has about 1.2 million in its military force, approximately 6% of the total population (Eberstadt and Banister, 1990).

Recent political events in the former Soviet Union suggest the possibility of a domestic supply arising from potential unemployment and thus a lesser need for foreign workers. A rapidly deteriorating Russian economy especially after the failed Moscow coup in August 1991, is expected to bring about considerable unemployment (Minakir, 1991). Another possible source of supply is the servicemen to be released as part of Russia's troop reduction program. However, the problem is that there

exist both a labor shortage and surplus in the Russian Far East (Minakir, 1991). Highly-paid skilled jobs are in short supply, whereas low-wage manual jobs have a high vacancy rate. Considering the relatively harsh climate and the lack of housing and social amenities in the Russian Far East, it is unlikely to expect large numbers of skilled and unskilled workers migrating from the European part of Russia.

The collapse of the Soviet Union and the ensuing disintegration between republics and within the Russian Federation damaged the traditional inter-regional linkages between the Far East and other regions. Cuts in military spending resulted in a decline in production by military-related industries. In the Far East, the economy is still dominated by state enterprises, while nonstate enterprises make up only 12 percent of the total enterprises (Schevchenko, 1992). All these events weakened the potential attraction of the Russian Far East in internal migration.

Riding the waves of independence and ethnic identity, the idea of an independent or autonomous Siberia and Far East region has recently been revived.[2] For Moscow, which has lost the control over important natural resources such as oil and gas in Central Asia, an autonomous Siberia and Far East region may not be acceptable. Regardless of the likelihood of an independent Russian Far East, the very idea is not an encouraging factor for Russians to migrate toward the Russian Far East.

In contrast, burgeoning border trade between China and Russia – naturally accompanied by increasing flows of petty traders, businessmen, entertainers, and so on across the border – suggests labor migration in one form or another. Four Chinese cities – Manzhouli, Heihe, Hunchun, and Suifenhe – were designated as "open border cities" in 1992. Recently, border trade between China and Russia reached 250 million Swiss Franc annually. Similarly, the number of Russian visitors to Heihe and Suifenhe reached an average of 2,000 per day in 1993. The railroad linking Hunchun in Jilin Province and Kraskino in Russia, which will be completed in 1993, together with the expansion of the Zarubino port is expected to stimulate trade, business, and population movements across the border.

In sum, the labor-deficit economies of Japan and South Korea can respond with capital export, labor import, or both. While transferring low value-added jobs abroad is one way of dealing with domestic labor shortages, the extent to which it can be a general solution to the problem is circumscribed by the immobility of capital in many of the industries affected by labor shortages. In other words, even with extensive off-shore investments as Japan made in the 1980s, there are still needs for importing foreign labor to meet the increasing demands in social and domestic

services, construction, and some labor-intensive manufacturing operations. While the capacity of Japan and South Korea in absorbing foreign labor is limited by social and political factors, there exists a sufficient pool of skilled and unskilled workers in China and, to a lesser extent, in North Korea. The key issue is how to achieve a region-wide balance of labor supply and demand in the midst of imbalanced labor demand and supply at the country/parts of a country level. The rationale for regional cooperation or integration lies in creating such a region-wide advantage stemming from joint use of resources including labor.

MIGRATION POLICIES IN NORTHEAST ASIA

The need for a region-wide perspective in labor supply and demand, however, does not square with the country positions prevailing in the region, especially in the market economies of Northeast Asia. For example, Japan has been reluctant to open its door to foreign labor because of the alleged social and cultural problems expected from the importation of foreign workers. Conservatives argue for banning foreign workers. They believe an inflow of people with different cultures and traditions will undermine the unique organizing principles of Japanese society – a homogeneous, monoethnic society (Lie, 1992). The liberal argument acknowledges the benefits and costs associated with the inflow of foreign workers, but stresses the international responsibility of Japan. Many liberals note the inevitability of foreign labor inflow and suggests one of Japan's responsibilities in the world is to deal with the poverty surrounding them. The mainstream argument advocates the inflow limited by strict regulations, citing both social and economic benefits and costs associated with foreign labor inflow (Lie, 1992). Meanwhile, Japan's domestic labor shortage and other international economic factors already have made the presence of foreign laborers a reality in Japanese society. There is little doubt that the number of foreign workers will only increase in the future because of sheer economic necessity. The lack of a national consensus on the subject of labor migration undermines the government's ability to formulate and implement a clear policy. Avoiding or delaying action will merely result in a choice by default (Spencer, 1992).

The Korean position is not much different from Japan's. The employment of foreign workers is limited in South Korea, except for a few categories in which it is legal. Immigration law does not allow unskilled foreign labor to enter the country. Nevertheless, it is estimated that more than 100,000 foreign workers are illegally engaged in employment. The major rationale for disallowing foreign workers to enter South Korea lies

in the perceived long-term social and economic burden arising from legalizing foreign workers. However, South Korean labor-intensive industries reportedly require foreign workers to sustain their operations. Because Korean workers shun away from 3-D jobs, it is increasingly difficult to find workers for manual production jobs. In addition, hiring foreign workers provides wage cost savings for enterprises because foreign workers are paid about half of the average wage of domestic workers. Considering the demand from businesses and industries for foreign workers, the Korean government appears to adopt a "status-quo" policy, implicitly endorsing the use of foreign workers to smooth out Korea's economic adjustment process, but not actively promoting an explicit policy of foreign labor importation. A recent discussion by policy makers to accept foreign workers as trainees indicates a dilemma facing the Korean government with regard to foreign workers (Park, 1993).

Obviously, China is very much interested in labor export. Since 1985, China has adopted a new strategy for the export of labor and contracting overseas construction projects. The authorities have relaxed restrictions on the recruitment of laborers by overseas corporations and now allow foreign firms to recruit directly in China. The strategy includes the employment of foreign engineers and managers in order to improve the efficiency of the corporations and increase their ability to contract more technology-intensive projects. The new strategy also includes diversifying markets for overseas contracts (Fang, 1991). China can earn much-needed foreign exchange by exporting labor. It is also a way of enabling workers to get on-the-job training, which is costly when provided within China. Furthermore, labor export helps to relieve unemployment and underemployment problems in China because there is an estimated 100 million or more surplus laborers and there will be an additional 22 million new entrants each year in the 1990s (Fang, 1991). Even in Northeast China, there will be more than one million underemployed agricultural workers by 1995 and there will be an annual stream of 150,000 or more new entrants to the existing labor force (Wang, 1991). All these indicate increasing migration pressure in China. The Russian Far East is and will be an alternative outlet for increasingly mobile Chinese labor.

The Russian Far East has had foreign guest workers since at least the mid-1960s. The need for foreign workers, especially for farming, construction, and light manufacturing is recognized in the Russian Far East. There is, however, a fear in Russia with regard to increasing movements of population into the Russian Far East by the Chinese. Labor import from China may not be welcome since it may eventually

mean an upset in the ethnic balance in the Russian Far East by the Chinese population (Sekiguchi and Noda, 1993). Also, the idea of the resettlement of ethnic Koreans in the Far East has not been well received by the Russians, although it is uncertain whether Koreans will come back to the Far East. Whether Koreans will leave Central Asia or not depends on both internal and external conditions in the Republics and the Russian Federation. If a law currently being drafted by the Russian Parliament is enacted, the Koreans may well be able to return to the Far East (In its current draft form, the law offers Russian citizenship to Koreans living in all the former Soviet republics and permits them to settle anywhere they want in Russia).[3] The prospect of jobs in the Far East, specifically in Nakhodka, where Seoul and Moscow recently reached agreement on the creation of an industrial park for some 100 South Korean companies, is likely to attract Koreans back to the Far East. The possibility of a Pacific reunion of ethnic Koreans is, however, perceived to be a potential threat to ethnic Russians in the Far East, who already feel threatened by the influx of traders, laborers and businessmen from across the Chinese border (Lilley, 1993).

CONCLUSION

With the continued opening-up of socialist economies and their improved relations with the market economies in Northeast Asia, there will be greater interaction across national borders, in particular, trade, capital flow, and the movement of people. Further liberalization and democratization in China and other socialist countries in Asia will stimulate long-term emigration and its likely destination is toward North America. In addition, the political liberalization of socialist economies and a reduction of international tensions make exits from socialist countries more likely and therefore may produce more emigration from those countries. In brief, the political and economic circumstances in Northeast Asia suggest increasing migration pressure from labor-surplus, low-income economies to labor-deficit, high-income countries.

In the receiving ends, internal political pressure may build up against migrants and thus contribute to considering immigration a serious problem. In recent years, ethnic conflicts arouse in significant number in the United States. Asian Americans came into conflict with other minority groups (Gardner, 1991). There are signs of rising racism in Europe and the United States, which could be translated into hatred and violence between ethnic groups, especially in economically hard times (*The Economist*, November 16 1991).

Differently from the U.S. and Canada, which have a relatively open social system to accept immigrants, the prosperous economies of Northeast Asia have a rather closed social system when it comes to foreign migrants. Ethnic homogeneity in Japan, South Korea, and partly in the Russian Far East is known to be another factor inhibiting a large number of foreign immigrants. Therefore, temporary migration, including both high-level manpower and low-level manpower, is more likely in Northeast Asia.

However, Japan considers the potential migration pressure from China seriously. Japan's population specialists point out increasing migration pressure in China after economic reform started in 1978 (Wakabayashi, 1992; Sugimoto, 1991). They think that if China had not adopted one child policy and had not tightly controlled the exit of its population, migration pressure would have been much higher. Blind pursuit of emigration from China to prosperous countries such as the United States, Japan and the Asian NIEs has been indeed increasing and arousing an anti-immigration attitude within the host countries.

As seen in the cases of Eastern Europe, political upheaval and internal conflicts might trigger massive population movements regardless of the social and political barriers confronting potential migrants.[4] For example, some 1.3 million people moved from ex-Comecon countries to the west in 1990. A couple million people a year are expected to emigrate from the former Soviet Union itself. Likewise, internal conflicts in China and the collapse of the authoritarian regime in North Korea will instigate outflows of population and therefore could be a trigger destabilizing the North Pacific. This possibility demonstrates the need for potential host countries to assist in the peaceful transition of China and North Korea.

There exists possible avenues for managing labor migration in Northeast Asia through concerted efforts of the nations involved. Regional economic cooperation that has been discussed for some time now will certainly help promote the development of underdeveloped areas in Northeast Asia – especially the Russian Far East, China's northeast, Mongolia, and North Korea – and consequently help contain potential migration flows in the region. If the political situation of Russia stabilizes and the development of the Russian Far East gets underway with the assistance of capital-rich countries, frontier development and settlement could be an important outlet of migratory pressure in the North Pacific in the 21st century. However, as the history of the early 20th century indicates, such a scheme should not be abused as a disguised foreign economic policy to extend a country's control over others' territory (see Appendix for the brief accounts of pre-War migration in Northeast Asia).

Multilateral arrangements regarding the joint management of labor migration may be necessary to materialize the benefits of migration. Considering the important role of international capital investment in both reducing migration pressure and attracting migration, it seems more beneficial to have concerted efforts channeling international capital into the projects with large employment multipliers. For the management of labor migration, the first step would be to set up a network to monitor labor flows within the region. Setting up labor training centers with employment services would be the next step to facilitate and coordinate the best use of labor in the region. The establishment of vocational schools with language courses in a few strategic locations would be the third step to enhance job mobility within both individual countries and the region. These international cooperative centers can be established and managed by the collaborative efforts of both governments and businesses, especially multinational corporations.

RESEARCH NEEDS

Considering that labor migration in Northeast Asia in the coming years is largely temporary, there is a clear need to identify the potential sources of this temporary migration and its likely destinations. For the case of labor sending countries, it is necessary to develop a measure for emigration pressure. One such measure could be the number of applications per 1000 workers from a particular geographic unit of measure (e.g., subnational regions). The chosen units of measure can be ranked according to their emigration pressure. A model can then be constructed in which the dependent variable would be emigration pressure and the explanatory variables would be the selected aggregate demographic and economic data for the chosen unit. The identification of high pressure units could form the basis for policy intervention to relieve such pressures. However, this approach cannot include illegal migrant workers. To gauge latent emigration pressure in the sending communities, we may need to take a different approach relying on individual information to construct a demographic-economic profile which would then afford some insight into an individual's propensity to emigrate. The identification of those groups with high migration potential would be a major step in designing policies aimed at reducing emigration pressures.

For the labor receiving countries, we need to identify those sectors and firms within those sectors which are currently using foreign labor, what their future plans are in this regard, and those firms that are short of labor and who would like to have access to foreign labor. The attributes of

these firms need to be established: for example, their labor intensity, the structure of their ownership and labor management, the type of labor they use, the sources of that labor, the degree of labor unionization, problems faced with regard to access to credit and technology, and so forth. Identifying the characteristics of firms that are associated with a high propensity to use, or want to use, foreign labor could suggest forms of policy intervention which may ameliorate the source of immigration pressures.

APPENDIX: Brief Accounts of Pre-World War II Migration in Northeast Asia

Historically, migration in the North Pacific, in Northeast Asia in particular, was dominated by planned migration for the purpose of colonization. Russia's colonization policy included the transplantation of Russians in Central Asia, Siberia and the Russian Far East and relocation of indigenous ethnic minorities from their homelands to other areas. Relocation of Korean residents from the Russian Far East to Central Asia is one example. Migration was an explicit policy tool for colonization.

The immigration of Koreans to China in large numbers started in the 1880s, when tens of thousands of poor Korean farmers crossed the border into China. It accelerated after 1910 when Korea was annexed by Japan. The Japanese colonial economic policy in Korea left many Korean farmers landless and thus, a large number of poverty-stricken farmers in the northern provinces moved to the Yanbian area in China and the Russian Far East to avoid economic hardships at home. Other Korean immigrants were recruited as laborers by the Japanese colonial government as the latter had control over Manchuria after the Japanese occupation of Manchuria (1931-32) and the establishment of Manchuguo (1932).

During the period of Japan's external aggression in the early 20th century, migration of the Japanese population was actively promoted to its overseas territories. The prewar military regime regarded Manchuria as Japan's lifeline and the major supply of natural resources. The transplantation of the Japanese population to Manchuria, Korea, Taiwan, and Sakhalin was implemented as a national policy. The number of non-military Japanese in Manchuria was about 1.2 million, followed by 713,000 in Korea, 322,000 in Taiwan and 277,000 in Sakhalin right before World War II. A total of 3.2 million non-military Japanese

repatriated from Japan's overseas territories after the war, in addition to 3.1 million military and para-military personnel (Watanabe, 1993).

In contrast, immigration of foreigners into Japan during the prewar period was mainly from Korea and Taiwan, which were under Japanese rule during the period. The fact that large numbers of Koreans were not voluntary migrants reflects Japan's double-edged migration policy – sending out Japanese to colonize overseas territories and bringing in Koreans and Taiwanese to supplement the manpower gap caused by the outflow. In 1940, there were 1,304,286 Koreans and 60,549 Chinese who resided in Japan (Watanabe, 1993).

During the first half of the 20th century, migration was an important element of Russia's expansion toward Siberia and the Far East. The population of the Russian Far East increased rapidly through the active promotion of migration from parts of Europe to Asia. It was 1.26, 2.56, and 4.35 million in 1926, 1939, and 1959, respectively, according to the census (Kirby, 1971). Russians and Ukranians who came as peasant "pioneers" formed the major settler groups. Certain remote Far Eastern territories were colonized by convicts – forced labor. Also, there was "military colonization" – discharged soldiers settled down with their families in the fertile border regions on the Ussuri River (Kolarz, 1954). With the beginning of large-scale development under the Five-Year Plan, efforts to increase the population of the Far East were directed at many levels including calling upon the Young Communist League for loyalty to the country and using moral appeal to many workers (Mandel, 1944).

Indigenous people and oriental immigrants living in the area were small in number, less than a million in total. About 30,000 Chinese and 180,000 ethnic Koreans lived in the Far East around 1930. After the occupation of south Sakhalin at the end of the war, some 400,000 Russians moved into that territory, replacing the Japanese. Around 180,000 Korean residents were relocated from the Far East to Central Asia under Stalin's orders in 1937. Soviet authorities considered the Koreans as a potential threat in the Russian Far East following Japan's move into Manchuria.[5]

Policies regarding ethnic minorities differed between countries. For example, Min (1992) attributes the different levels of ethnicity between the two Korean groups in China and Japan to the differences in minority policy between the two countries (China's pluralistic minority policy emphasizing ethnic autonomy versus Japan's assimilationist policy[6]) in addition to the difference in the context of migration and the different levels of influence from the home country.[7]

Table 9.1 Demographic transition (DT) indices, degree of urbanization, and nonagricultural employment in Asia

Subregion and country	DT index 1	DT index 2	% urban	% nonagricultural employment
Former Soviet Union	0.80	0.77	66	81.8
East Asia				
China	0.83	0.71	26	40.0
Hong Kong	0.99	0.99	100	99.2
Japan	0.98	0.93	77	93.3
South Korea	0.86	0.84	74	83.3
Taiwan	0.86	0.87	71	87.2
Southeast Asia				
Cambodia	0.72	0.69	13	u
Indonesia	0.60	0.60	31	44.1
Laos	0.35	0.30	19	u
Malaysia	0.71	0.67	51	74.0
Myanmar	0.52	0.46	24	30.3
Philippines	0.58	0.66	43	54.8
Singapore	0.89	0.92	100	99.7
Thailand	0.69	0.60	19	33.6
Vietnam	0.59	0.51	20	u
South Asia				
Bangladesh	0.27	0.33	14	40.5
Bhutan	0.27	0.25	13	u
India	0.53	0.47	26	47.8
Nepal	0.33	0.29	8	u
Pakistan	0.28	0.28	28	52.6
Sri Lanka	0.81	0.68	22	52.2

Notes: DT index 1 = .5([7.9-TFR]/6.7)+.5(1-[79-E_0]/37); DT index 2 = .4([7.9-TFR]/6.7)+.4(1-[79-E_0)/37)+.20(U), where TFR = total fertility rate and E_0 = life expectancy at birth.

u = unavailable

Sources: Computed from *1993 World Population Data Sheet*, Population Reference Bureau,1993; *Yearbook of Labor Statistics 1992*, International Labor Office, 1992.

Table 9.2 Growth rate of per capita income and 1991 per capita income

Subregion and country	Annual growth rate 1980-91	Per capita income 1991 (US$)
East Asia		
China	7.8	390[a]
Hong Kong	5.6	14,341
Japan	3.6	27,233
South Korea	8.7	6,498
Taiwan	12.7	8,038
Southeast Asia		
Indonesia	3.9	638
Laos	na	220
Malaysia	2.9	2,448
Myanmar	na	250
Philippines	-1.2	672[a]
Singapore	5.3	11,845
Thailand	5.9	1,604
Vietnam	na	200[a]
South Asia		
Bangladesh	1.9	210
Bhutan	na	440
India	3.2	361
Nepal	2.1	170
Pakistan	3.2	414
Sri Lanka	2.5	465

Note: "a" refers to "1990."

Sources: *Asia 1993 Yearbook*, Far Eastern Economic Review, 1993; *World Development Report, 1993*, World Bank, 1993; *Statistical Yearbook of the Republic of China, 1992*, Executive Yuan, Republic of China, 1992.

Table 9.3 Population and economy of North Pacific, 1990

Subareas	Area (1,000km)	Population (million)	Density (persons/km)	Per capita GNP ($)
China	9,561	1,143.3	120.0	326
Northeast China	1,970	121.6	60.5	392
Japan	378	123.5	326.7	25,430
North Korea	125	21.4	170.6	1,095
South Korea	99	42.8	439.5	5,569
Mongolia	1,565	2.1	1.3	na
Former Soviet Union (1989)	22,402	288	13	na
Russian Far East (1989)	6,216	7.9	1.3	na
Canada	9,976	26.5	2.7	20,470
United States	9,373	250.0	26.7	21,790

Sources: Sallnow (1989) for Soviet Union and Soviet Far East; State Statistical Bureau (1991) for China; Hankuk Ilbo (1991) for North and South Korea; World Bank (1992) for other information.

Table 9.4 Growth of labor force and manufacturing employment

Subregion and country	Pop. (million)	Growth of Labor Force				Annual growth rate of manufacturing employment		Annual growth rate of service employment		Annual growth rate of nonagricultural employment	
		1970-80	1980	1980-90	1990	1970-80	1980-90	1970-80	1980-90	1970-80	1980-90
		%	Persons (1,000s)	%	Persons (1,000s)	(%)	(%)	(%)	(%)	(%)	(%)
East Asia											
China	1,158.20	na	424,380	5.1	697,320	na	3.74				
Hong Kong	5.5	3.79a	2,320	1.71	2750	5.51	-2.23		4.41		2.09
Japan	124.2	0.93	56,500	1.23	63,840	-0.07	0.97	2.3	2.01	1.68	1.59
South Korea	43.6	3.53	14,431	2.51	18,487	8.67	5.07		5.13		5.16
Taiwan	20.6	3.6	6,629	2.42	8,423	8.65	2.16		4.6		3.2
Southeast Asia											
Indonesia	185	2.00b	52,421	4.14c	75,508d	4.21b	4.60c				
Malaysia	18.6	3.56	5,122	3.24	7,047	9.54	5.59				
Myanmar	41.6	2.5	14,010	1.17	15,740	3.66	0.27				
Philippines	60.7	3.48	17,308	3.55	24,525	2.61	1.89				
Singapore	2.8	4.88	1,116	3.11	1,516	8.52	2.68		3.7		3.39
Thailand	57.6	4.31e	22,728	3.4	31,750	4.70e	5.76				
Vietnam	70.8	na	21,600	3.44	30,300	na	3.99				

Table 9.4 (cont'd)

South Asia							
Bhutan	0.6	1.77i	650j	na	na	0i	na
India	875.2	2.78a	22,830	1.61k	25,950l	2.59a	0.39k
Pakistan	117.3	3.22	24,890	2.49	31,820	2.37	1.14
Sri Lanka	17.2	2.08m	5,017j	1.85n	5,916	2.48m	6.14n

Note: [a]annual growth rate during the period from 1971-80
[b]annual growth rate during the period from 1976-80
[c]annual growth rate during the period from 1980-89
[d]figure for 1989
[e]annual growth rate during the period from 1972-80
[f]annual growth rate during the period from 1973-80
[g]annual growth rate during the period from 1980-86
[h]figure for 1986
[i]annual growth rate during the period from 1970-81
[j]figure for 1981
[k]annual growth rate during the period from 1980-88
[l]figure for 1988
[m]annual growth rate during the period from 1971-81
[n]annual growth rate during the period from 1981-90

Source: *Asia 1993 Yearbook*, Far Eastern Economic Review, 1993; *Japan Statistical Yearbook 1991*, Statistics Bureau Management and Coordination, 1991; *Key Indicators of Developing Asian and Pacific Countries 1984 and 1992*. Asian Development Bank.

Figure 9.1 Demographic transition index and nonagricultural employment in Asia



Figure 9.2 Labor force and employment growth (1970-80)



Figure 9.3 Labor force and employment growth (1980-90)



NOTES

1. Conceptually there are five categories of situation in which migrants may be perceived as a threat to the country: when refugees and migrants are opposed to the regime of their home country(permission for Chinese students to remain in the U.S. after the 1989 Tiananmen incident because of the possible persecution in China was regarded by China as interference in its internal affairs); when refugees and migrants are perceived as a political threat to the regime of the host country; immigrants are seen as a cultural threat; immigrants are seen as a social and economic problems for the host society; and when the host society uses immigrants as an instrument of threat against the country of origin (Weiner, 1992/93).
2. During the period of 1920-22, the Far Eastern Republic was an independent state recognized by many countries including the United States.
3. Soviet Koreans have different desires and opinions according to their occupation and family situation. Educated professionals want to move to big cities such as Moscow and Leningrad, while farmers prefer places that are good for farming. Many others seem to prefer to stay where they are now insofar as no serious political disruptions occur.
4. Political uncertainty of Hong Kong after 1997 already triggered an annual outflow of 60,000 Hong Kong residents to other countries, notably to Canada, the United States and Australia.
5. There is a controversy around this issue. The above position is best explained by Henry R. Huttenbach, 1993, "The Soviet Koreans: Products of Russo-Japanese Imperial Rivalry," *Central Asian Survey* 12: 59-69. For other explanations on the forced relocation of Soviet Koreans, refer Songmoo Kho, 1990, "Koreans in the Soviet Union," *Korea and World Affairs* 4: 137-174.
6. M. Weiner (1989) argues that the origins of the prejudice and discrimination against Koreans in Japan are found in the years following the Meiji Restoration of 1868. A new concept of a nation based largely upon racial mythology was necessitated by Japan's confrontation with the wealth and power of the West. Subsequently, the sense of racial superiority engendered by the mythology was reinforced by the introduction of a national educational system which promoted nationalism. Throughout the pre-1945 period the Japanese people were socialized into accepting a view of the world in which their country was portrayed as the only Asian nation capable of creating a viable alternative to Western civilization. Such beliefs are still shared by many Japanese.
7. According to Min (1992), the Koreans in Japan were colonized minority, whereas the Korean Chinese were voluntary migrants. The concentration of the Korean Chinese in the Yanbian area as a territorial base for the Korean cultural and psychological center has facilitated their ethnic identity and

ethnic attachment, whereas the Korean Japanese do not have a comparable ethnic enclave. The Korean Chinese community has been influenced by North Korea and recently by South Korea, while neither South Korea nor North Korea has had much influence on the Korean Japanese community. However, others view that some Koreans went to Japan voluntarily for a better income and opportunity so that the Japanese government actually tried to divert the flow to other areas such as Manchuria (see Ki-Hoon Kim's doctoral dissertation, University of Hawaii, 1990).

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